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[L. A. No: 1§477. In Bank. Mar. 14, 1946.]

.,

ESTHER HEATON, Respondent, v. MILTON KERLAN,
M.D. et al., Defendants; ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY
CORPORATION (a C~p'oration), Appellant.
".

[1] Workmen's Compensation-Actions Against Third Persons.-

Lien for Expenditures.~The expenditures for "compensation"
for which a lien is allowed the employer or his insurance carrier on the injured employee's recovery against a third person
(Lab. Code, § 3856), include expenditures for all benefits conferred on the employee by Lab. Code, §§ 3201-6002 (see
§ 3207). and therefore include expenditures for medical and
hospital treatment (§ 4600), as well as for disability benefits
awarded (§§ 4650-4663).
[2] ld.-Award-Scope.-An award of workmen's compensation
included compensation for disability by malpractice of the
doctor who diagnosed and treated the employee's fractured
arm for a sprain, where the award was made over 17 months
after the last of the doctor's treatments, and where the fact .
that the award was based on the condition of the injury after
the treatments and a subsequent operation was established
by a finding that the employee's injuries included "permanent
disability consisting of loss of heai! and neck of radius of
minor forearm."
[8] ld.-Compensable Injuries-Rendering Service at Time.-Recovery of compensation is not conditional on the employee'.
rendering service to the employer at the time of the injury.
[4] ld.-Compensable Injuries-Aggravated Injuries Due to !fecti-]
cal Treatment.-The rule that the aggravation of injuries by'
the negligence of a doctor is within the scope of the risk
ereated by the original tortious act, applies in workmen's com-'
pensa.tion cases. (Disapproving of Smith v. Golde" State Ho ..
pital, 111 Cal.App. 667. 296 P. 127.)

[1] See 27 OaJ.Jur. 274.
[4] Workmen's Compensation Act as affecting liability of or
remedy against employer for injury due to medical or surgical
treatment of employee after injury, note, 127 A.L.R. 1108. See,
also,27 OaLJur. 423.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6, 8, 10, 11] Workmen's Compensation, § 35; [2] Workmen's Compensation, § 191(1); [3] Workmen'.
Compensation, § 77; [4, 9] Workmen's Compensation, § 116; [5]
Workmen's Compensation, 138; [7] Workmen'. CompensatioD,
1199.
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[5] ld.-Actions Aga.inst Thirtd Persons-Appeal-Moot Questions.
-In a malpractice action by an injured employee against a
doctor who treated t(e injury, wherein the employer's compensation insurance carrier filed a lien on any judgment that
might be recovered, an appeal f:r:om a judgment dismissing the
application after sustaining a oiiemurrer thereto did not become moot on the ground ~t th(' employee's judgment had
been fully satisfied, where the insurance carrier filed its notice
of appeal before the doctor satisfied said judgment, and where,
in view of Lab. Code, § 3858, the doctOl could not destroy the
lien by satisfying the judgment without first giving the employer a reasonable opportunity to perfect and satisfy his
lien.
[6] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-Lien for Expenditures.In an action by an employee against a third person on account
of injuries to the employee, wherein the employer's compensation insurance carrier files a lien on any judgment that might
be recovered, the court has jurisdiction to fix the amount of
the lien. (See Lab. Code, §§ 3852, 3853, 3856, 3857.)
[7] ld.-Award-Oonclusiveness and EJfect.-When the Industrial
Accident Commission has made an award fixing the compensation to which an injured employee is entitled, the award will
govern any later determinatioln as to what was payable as
compensation under the award.
[8] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-Lien for Expenditures.Where compensation is paid by the empioyer to an injured
employee without proceedings in the Industrial Accident Commission, the court in ascertaining the amount of the lien to be
allowed the employer or his insurance carrier on the employee's
recovel'I against a third person, must determine what amount
was or
be properly expended in fulfillment of the employer's duty to compensate the employee.
[9] ld.-Oompensable Injuries-Aggravated Injuries Due to Medical Treatment.-8ince an injured employee is entitled to compensation for the injury including the aggravation thereof
caused by a doctor's malpractice, the commission need not
determine to what extent the employee's disability was caused
by the malpractice. Awards for disability are based on the
ultimate result of the accident, and the employee is entitled
to recover for the extent of his disability based on such result,
regardless of the fact that the disability has been aggravated
and increased by the intervening negligence of the doctor.
[10] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-Lien for Expenditures.
-The amount of the lien to be allowed the employer or his
insurance carrier on the injured employee's recovery in • malpractice action is equal to the amount of compensation paid or
payable, including medical expenditures Dot covered by the
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commission's award, that was attributable to the malpractice
of the doctor who treated tile injury. In other words, the
amount of the employer's"l.ien is limited to the amount that
he is required to pay because of the malpractice.
[11] ld.-Actions Against Third Ppsons-Lien for Expenditures.
-Under Lab. Code, § 3856, the emp~yer's lien on the injured
employee's recovery against a third person attaches to the
entire judgment, and it is not necessary to segregate the put
thereof that represents damages for pain 'and suffering.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County dismissing an application for a lien after
sustaining a demurrer thereto. Walter S. Gates, Judge.
Reversed.
Syril S. Tipton for Appellant.
Lyndol L. Young as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant. ;
F. Murray Keslar for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Respondent Esther Heaton fractured her
left arm in the course of her employment as a masseuse. Her
employer carried workmen's compensation' insurance with
appellant Associated Indemnity Corporation, and respondent
was treated by a doctor selected by appellant. The doctor, I
without taking an X-ray of respondent's arm, diagnosed and:
treated for a sprain. The arm did not knit, and by the time
another doctor discovered the fracture, it became necessary
to remove the head of the radius, and the arm was permanently disabled.
On January 20, 1942, respond-ent brought an action against
the doctor for malpractice and recovered a judgment for:
$20,000, which was later reduced to $8,000. Actions against
other doctors were dismissed. On August 19, 1942, the Industrial Accident Commission found that respondent had a permanent disability of 1614 per cent and awarded her $1,625
in permanent disability benefits, and appellant paid the award.
Before the trial of the malpractice action, appellant filed an
application under section 3856 of the Labor Code- for a lien
I

·"The court shall first apply, out of the entire amount of any judgment
for any damage recovered by the employee, a 8Ilfficient amount to reim.'
burse the employer for the amount of his expenditures for compensation.,
If the employer has not joined in the action or has not brought aetion,
or if his action has not been consolidated, the court, on his application
shall allow, as a first lien against the entire amount of any judgm8llt
for any damages recovered by the employee, the amount of the employer'a
expenditures for compensation." (Lab. Code, 13856.)
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upon any judgment--that might be recovered in the action.
Respondent's motion to strike the application was granted,
a demurrer by the doctor thereto was sustained without leaye
to amend, and a judgment fJ.f dismissal was entered. This
appeal followed.
.,
Appellant contends that by vil'4le of its alleged lien, it has
a right to reimbursement out of the proceeds of the judgment
against the doctor for that part of the award, allegedly
amounting to $1,425, and for that part of tlLe medical expenditures, allegedly totalling $246.05, exceeding the disability
benefits and medical payments to which respondent would
have been entitled had there been no malpractice.
[1] The payment of an award that includes compensation
for negligent treatment of an injury, and the payment of a
judgment for damages caused by the same treatment, would
amount to double recovery. In this state, however, a double
recovery is precluded by the provision that the employer or
his insurance carrier may obtain a lien against the entire
amount of any judgment for any damages recovered by the
employee for "the amount of his expenditures for compensation." (Lab. Code, § 3856; San Bernardino Oounty v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 217 Cal. 618, 627, 628 [20 P.2d 673];
Evans v. Los Angeles Ry. Oorp., 216 Cal. 495, 498 [14 P.2d
752]; Jacobsen v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 212 Cal. 440, 447
[299 P. 66].) The expenditures for "compensation" for
which a lien is allowed the employer or his insurance carrier
include expenditures for all benefits conferred on the employee
by sections 3201-6002 of the Labor Code (Lab. Code, § 3207),
and therefore include expenditures for medical and hospital
treatment (ibid., § 4600; Pacific Emp. Ins. 00. v. Industrial
Ace. Oom., 66 Cal.App.2d 376, 380 [152 P.2d 501]), as well
as for disability benefits awarded. (Lab. Code, §§ 4650-4663.)
[2] Respondent contends that the award did not include
compensation for disability caused by the malpractice. The
award was made on August 19, 1942, over seventeen months
after the last of the doctor's treatments. The fact that the
award was based on the condition of the injury after the
treatments and the subsequent operation, is established beyond dispute by the finding that respondent'. injuries included "permanent disability consisting of loss of. head and
neck of radius of minor forearm.. . • • "
Respondent also contends that her cause of aetion against
the doctor for malpractice was separate mel distinct from
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her claim for workmen's compcnsition, and that the aggravated injury resulting from the negligent treatment by
the doctor was not incurred in the course of htr employment
(Lab. Code, § 3600 (b» since she was not rendering any service to her employer at the tim~ of the treatments. She concludes that even if compenmtion for the injuries caused by
the malpractice was included in the award, the commission, by
including such compensation, exceeded its jurisdiction. [3] Recovery of compensation is not conditiopal upon the employee'8
rendering service to the employer at the time of the injury.
(California Cas. Indemnity Exch. v. Indnstrial Ace. Com., 21
Cal.2d 461, 465 [132 P.2d 815] and cited cases.) [4] It has
been settled by decisions in tort actions that the aggravation
of injuries by the negligence of a doctor is within the scope '
of the risk created by the original tortious act. (Ash v. Mortenson, 24 Cal.2d. 654, 657 [150 P.2d 876]; Dewhirst v. Leopold, ]94 Cal. 424 [229 P. 30]: Blackwell v. American Film
Co., 189 Cal. 689 [209 P. 9991; Boa v. San Francisco-Oakland
Term. Rys., 182 Cal. 93 []87 P. 2]; Fields v. Mankato Elec.
Traction Co., 116 Minn. 218 [133 N.W. 577] ; see Rest .. Torts,
§~ 457,872; Prosser on Torts, 362: 39 A.L.R. 1268.) The same
rule applies in this state in workmen's compensation cases;
" ... 'under the great weight of authority the employer is
liable for all legitimate consequence.'l following an accident,
inclmlillA' unskilfulness or error of judgment of the physician
furnished as required, and the employee is entitled to reeover
Illlder the schedule of compensation for the extent of his
(lisa hilit:-;" based on the ultimate result of the accident, regard- i
less of the fact that thp. disability has been aggravated and .
increas('d by the intervening negligence or carelessness of the
('mplo?er's selected physician.' The reasonableness of this
prinriple is patent." (Fitzpatrick v. Fidelity & Casua.lty
Co .. 7 ~f' 1.2d 230. 234 r60 P.2d 276J; D~7.1(Lrd v. Oity of Los
A.nnpl('.~ 20 Ca1.2d 599. 604 rt27 P.2d 917]: Nelson v. Assodated Indemnity Oorpora.tion, 19 CaI.App.2d 564 [66 P.2d
H~41: see 39 A.L.R 12i6: 98 A.L.R. 1387: 127 A.hR. 1108;
13n A.TJ.R. ]010: 7] C.J. 641 et 8eq.)
Parific ronst CasllaUy Co. v. Pillsbur11, 171 Cal. 319 [153 P.
241. on which respondent relies, is clearly distinguishable,
since it involved a refracture of the old break after the employment han ceased. (Of. Head Dn1ling 00. v. Industrial
Ace. rom .. 177 Cnl. 194 f170 P. 157]; Shell Co. of California
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 36 Ca1.App. 463 1172 P. 611]; Shaw
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v. Owl Drug 00., 4 Cal.App.~ 191 [40 P.2d 588]; Brown v.
Beck, 63 Cal.App. 686 [22<J P. 14]; Rest., Torts, § 460.)
Smith v. Golden State Hospital, 111 Cal.App. 667 [296 P.
127], on which respondent also relies, held that receipt of
compensation for additional injuries c'aused by malpractice
does not bar recovery by the employee from the negligent
doctor in an action for dam{ges. Language in that case that
negligence in the treatment of an injury is not within the
scope of the risk created by the injury is inconsistent with the
Fitzpatrick. Dillard and Nelson case~. supra, and is disapproved.
[6] Respondent contends that the present appeal has become moot on the ground that her judgment has been fully
satisfied and that no lien can therefore attach thereto. Appellant filed its notice of appeal, however. before the doctor satisfied respondent's judgment. If an employee has obtained a
judgment against a third person for hi'! compensable injury,
"No satisfaction of such judgment in whole or in part, shall
be valid without giving the employer notice and a reasonable
opportUJl1ty to perfect and sati'lfy his lien." (Lab. Code,
~ 3858. ) The employer is denied such an opportunity if,
during the pendeney of his appeal. the judgment is satisfied
and no arrangement is made to protect the lien. The doctor
could not therefore destroy the lien by satisfying the judgment.
Since appellant is entitled to a lien, the motion to strike
should have been denied and the demurrer overruled.
[6] The contention has been advanced that even if appellant is entitled to a lien. only the Industrial Accident Commission has jurisdiction to fix the amount thereof. Section
5300 of the Labor Code provideI'! that proceedings for "the
recovery of compensation. or concerning' any right or liability
arising out of or incidental thereto" IIha11 be "inst.it.uted
before the commission and not elsewhere. except as ot.herwise
provided in Divi'lions IV and V." It is provided in division
IV of the Labor Code that the court has jurisdiction to determine the amount of the lien. Under chapter 5 of division IV.
an employer or his insurance carrier may obtain reimburs~
ment for expenditure..q in compensating his employee for an
injury caused by a third person bv bringing an action against
Rllch person (Lab. Code. ~ 3852). by joining' in an action
brought by the employee (I.Jab. Code. § 3853). or if both
actions were brought independently, .by consolidating them
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(Lab. Code, § 3853), 01" by claiming a lien in a judgment for
any damages recove~d by the employee. (Lab. Code, § 3856.)
These remedies are expressly within the jurisdiction of the
court. Thus sections 3856 and 3857 provide: "The court shall
first apply, out of the entire 8.Vl0unt of any judgment for any
damage recovered by the employee, a sufficient amount to reimburse the employer for the amount of his expenditures for
compensation. If the employer has not joined in the acHon
or has not brought action. or if his action has not been consolidated, the court, on his application shan allow, as a first
lien against the entire amount of any jJIdgment for any damages recovered by the employee, the amount of the employer's
expenditures for compensation." (Lab. Code, § 3856.) "The
court shall, npon further application at any time before the
judgment is satisfled, allow as a further lien the amonnt of
any· expenditures of the employer . . . subsequent to the
original order." (Lab. Code, § 3857.) It clearly appears from
these provisions that the court has jurisdiction to fix the
amount of the lien. (Jacobsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 212
Cal. 440. 448 [299 P. 66].)
[7] When the Industrial Accident Commission has made
an award fixing the compensation to which the employee is
entitled, the award will govern any later determination as
to what was payable as compensation under the award. An
award, however. may relate only to part of the compensation,
su('h as disabi1it~, benefits. leaving uncovered such expenditures
as those for medical and hospital treatment. [8] FreCluently i
compensation is paid by the employer without proceedin~ in:
the Industrial Accident Commission. In such cases the court i
in ascertaining the amount of t.he lien, must determine what
amount was or will be properly expended in fulfillment of
the employer's duty to compensate the emnloyee. Of oreno
v. Los Angeles Transfer 00., 44 Cal.App. 551. 554 [186 P.
800]: see .Jacobsen v. Ind1Mtrial Ace. Com., supra, 212 Cal.
440. 448.) [9] In the present case the commission determined
the amount of the disability benefits to which respondent was
entitled under the act. but it did not determine what part
thereof was attributable to the aggravation of respondent's
injury caused by the doctor's malpractice. Since respondent
was entitled to compensation for the injury including such
aggravation. the commission had no reason to determine to
what extent respondent's disability was caused by the malpractice, or the amount of compensation payable for disability
80 caused. Awards for disability are based em. the ultimate
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result of the accident; " ... the ,fmployee is entitled to recover
under the schedule of compensation for the extent of his disa bility based on the ultimatt!'"result of the accident, regardless
of the fact that the disability hM been aggra.va.ted and increased by the intervening negligence or carelessness of the
pmployer's !'lelected physician'." (Fi'h:patrick v. Pidelity &;
Casualty Co., supra, 7 Cal~d 2::10. 2::14: Dillard v. City of Los
.4.ngeles, supra, 20 Ca1.2d !)!l9. 604: Nelson v. Associated Indemnitll Corporation, supra, 19 Cal.App.2d 564; see Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., Inc .. 267 N.Y. no. 417 f196 N.E. 308. 98
A.L.R. 1387]; 27 Cal.Jur. 423.) Whether or not there was
malpractice had to be determined in the action against the
doctor. Given this determination. it remains to be determined
what aggravation of the original injury resulted from the
malpractice. [10] The amount of appellant's lien is equal
to the amount of compensation paid or payable. including
medical expenditures not covered b~' the award. that was attributable to the malpractice. In other words the amount of
the employer's lien ill limited to the am01mt thRt he ill required
to pay because of the malpractice.
[11] The employer's lien attaches to the "entire amount"
of a judgment "ror any damages." (Lab. Code, § 3856.)
The Legislature 110 defined the lien (Stat.c;. 1931, p. 2370. Deering's Gen. Laws. ]931. Act 4749) after this court held that
the lien of the employer under t.he former Rtatute did not
attach to that part of a jl1dmnent Tepresenting damages for
the employee's pain and suffering. and suggested that the
difficulties of lIegregatinl! the elements of the employee'R Te·
covery "mi/!ht well can for further le/rlslativp action on the
subject." (Jacobsen v. Tnd1(.strial Ace. Com., supra. 212 Cal.
440. 449.) Under the statute as amended. it is clear that the
employer's lien attaches to the entire judgment and that it is
no longer necessary to segregate the part thereof that represent.c; damages for pain and suffering. (Pacific Gas &; Electric Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 8 Cal.App.2d 499, 504 [47
P.2d 783J.)
The judgment of dismissal is reversed.
Gibtion, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J.,
and Spence, J., concurred.
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